CHAPTER 6
Cultural Insecurity
Rather than assuming the existence of a global cultural regime, it is
more appropriate to talk about a process of globalization of Western culture
by means of a revolution in communications. According to some, and paraphrasing
Toffler we live in a world of "future shock" — one so dependent on computers
and telecommunications that should these gadgets cease to function, this
would be tantamount to switching off global civilization (Pelton, 1981).
The velocity of innovation in telecommunications technologies has risen
at an exponential rate since their emergence in the last century and is
still expanding at a much faster pace than actual demand. By way of illustration,
international satellite communication, measured by traffic in half voice
circuits (HVCs), has increased in less-developed countries from 13,174
units in 1979 to 86,885 in 1993; a growth of 559.5%, or 39.9% per year.
In the developed countries, including the former Soviet Union, the expansion
has been from 21,167 to 162,558; this is 668% growth in 14 years, or 47.7%
per annum (Pelton 1981). These developments build upon — and further globalize
— the already vast and expanding realm of radio, telephone, television
and telecommunications in general.
But communications technology, irrespective of its wide spread is neither
neutral, nor freely available. It is a highly concentrated business. In
1988, the top 10 information and communication enterprises which virtually
controlled the technology and R&D of global communications and informatics,
included two American (IBM and AT&T), four Japanese (NTT, Matsushita,
NEC and Toshiba), one German (the state-owned Deutsche Bundespost), one
Dutch (Phillips), one British (British Telecom) and one French (France
Telecom) company. Their volume of annual sales was over $266 billion. Likewise,
of the top 10 media enterprises, which dominated the bulk of global newsprint
and broadcasting, eight, including the top two were American owned, with
annual sales amounting to $24 billion. The remaining three were a German,
an Australian and a Japanese conglomerate (Frederick 1993).
In the last two decades, "a combination of forces, political, economic,
cultural and technological have moved the international mass media industry
towards more competition and less regulation on a global basis" (US Department
of Commerce 1993). This has meant, especially in Western Europe, Latin
America and Eastern Europe, a disappearance of state-owned public information
systems and their replacement by private international consortia, which
rely heavily on imported materials. A highly stratified global information
order has emerged. In 1986, only four countries, the USA, Japan, China,
India and the then USSR, imported less than 10% of their television programming.
The lower layers were made of those countries whose cultural imports ranged
from over 10% to those externally dependent for their programming (Mowlana
1986). In the years ever since, the system has become even more stratified,
with only the USA and Japan remaining on top.
The development of the news and entertainment industry has meant an
unprecedented explosion of cultural imports practically everywhere. The
centre of the dissemination is clearly the USA, where the fastest growing
industry is culture. In 1991 foreign sales accounted for 39% of US film
and television revenue, a 30% increase over 1986. Between 1987 and 1991,
net exports in this sector doubled: $7 billion, over the past record of
$3.5 billion. In addition, the export of American records, tapes and other
recordings rose from $286 million in 1989 to $419 million in 1991; an increase
of 47%. To this, one must add the ever-expanding computer software market.
A comparison between US cultural imports and exports gives a clear direction
of the communication flows (Table 21).
| Table 21. Motion picture and television: US global sales,
imports and exports. |
|
1987 |
1988 |
1989 |
1990 |
1991 |
Worldwide sales
Export
Imports
Net |
3512
1752
62
1090 |
4656
1444
505
639 |
5273
1740
111
1029 |
7514
2219
112
2107 |
7016
2303
81
2122 |
| Source: Motion Picture Association of America 1992, pp.
1, 15, 20. |
In addition to unidirectionality, media programming, especially in radio
and television, shows marked uniformity. An average of 20% of broadcasting
is dedicated to information, 4% goes to advertising and more than half
is devoted to entertaimnent (Unesco 1987). If we keep in mind the lower
tiers of the global information and communications order, where most countries
are located, between 40 and 60% of all television broadcasting time is
imported, then the phenomenal impact of "global" (that is, imported) entertainment
can be appreciated. Its impact is particularly strong among the young,
who are the main target audience of the entertainment industry.
As indicated above, both the broadcast and the production of the technology
flows from North to South. Therefore, it is "quite possible that... the
external impulse transmitted... is so powerful that all forms of national
transformation converge towards a small number of common and hence universal
types" (Unesco 1982). One emerging cultural pattern has been referred to
as an elite managerial culture: "both a set of attitudes, values and behaviour
models, and a set of forms and models of organization" (Unesco 1982)) centre
on individual competitiveness. Its mass ideological correlates are the
culture of consumerism in its mainstream and pop versions.
Time,
Newsweek, Reader's Digest,
US News and World Report,
The Economist, but more so CNN and Much Music, all espousing a similar
worldview, are the conveyor belts in the transmission of a common neomaterialist
world view. Its foundations are inserted in the same possessive individualism
and competitiveness of the past, yet this time the message is geared to
a global consumer audience conditioned by a mass marketed pop culture wrapping.
The elite doctrine underpinning this deceivingly chaotic ideological coating
is neoliberalism. In the new culture "cyberpunk" and market economics blend
in a complex amalgam.
Not a Clash, but a Crisis of Civilization
The cultural thrust discussed above has been equated by elites at the core
with the notion of modernity. As the Marxist-Leninist strain of the modern
fell into disrepute with the disintegration of the "really existing" socialisms
of Eastern Europe, its capitalist variety has become, by default, the dominant
paradigm. T'here seems to be no alternative hegemonic discourse at the
present time, other than the reassertion of religious fundamentalism —
as with the Islamic revival throughout the Middle East — or the nostalgic
critique of postmodernism by Western intellectuals. However, even this
apparently radical postmodern critique starts from the premise of a dominant
Western culture. Therefore, what appears on the surface as a critical analysis
of modernity is, linguistic pyrotechnics notwithstanding, at closer scrutiny
a manifestation of neo or hypermodernism, not a substantial departure from
mainstream thought. Thus, despite the rhetoric surrounding the "crisis
of modernity," modernization remains unchallenged as the prevailing teleology
and deontology of development. Its alienating manifestations involve five
major characteristics which are outlined below.
Mindless Incrementalism
The aforementioned "software loop" inserted in an increasingly globalized
culture, far from offering a solution to existing dysfunctions, tends to
deepen them. The standard prescription to deal with problems of poverty
and/or equity is, from this prism, more of the same, "growth" with technological
fixes which created precisely the previous predicament. The double fetish
of growth with "technocratic" answers tends to have the long-term effect
of multiplying dysfunctions, or postponing much needed wide-ranging and
innovative solutions. As mentioned earlier, socialism, as well as liberal
capitalism and their political and developmental corollaries were deeply
encased in a "modern" world view. Scientific socialism was just another
way to reach modernity. Liberal capitalism nowadays has mutated from its
earlier Keynesian forms into a broader and encompassing synthesis of Trilateralist
neoliberalism. Like its dialectical–materialist counterpart, this ideology
is imbued with a scientific pretension. But its appeal transcends the discourse
of current economic orthodoxy as spread by mainstream university curricula.
It is also grounded in the trappings of traditional elitist beliefs on
authority, in "common sense" and in induced opinion-forming campaigns through
the business-controlled media.
The Constructed Hegemony of Neoclassical Economics
The central tenet of the abovementioned belief system is that only competitive
and unregulated markets hold the key to progress. Conversely, those unable
or incompetent to adapt, compete and abide by the objective laws of history
— and the market — or acquire the attributes of outward success, deserve
to descend to the "abyss" of abject squalor. "No pain, no gain" is the
capsular ideological chain of signification of the new scolasticism.
Behind the Kuznetsian slogan there lies an operational doctrine characterized
by an extreme skewness in the domestic and global distribution of "pain"
for the many and "gain" for the few. Neoliberalism has evolved into a sort
of holistic economic determinism of the right, draped in "folksy" clothes.
It encompasses a theory of history, a political economy (public choice)
and a theory of world politics (complex interdependence). It is also a
vanguard political movement of the well-to-do which exhibits many of the
epistemiologically fallacious assumptions of its now-defunct and discredited
ideological opposite. "Really existing" capitalism, rather than "really
existing" socialism is erected as the only possible teleology at the end
of history, while market reductionism substitutes for class reductionism.
The difficulty with this kind of monism, as with any form of exclusionary
scholasticism, is that, having reached the end of contradictions, it soon
runs out of ideas. Thought processes evolve into tautologies and slogans;
education becomes simple training, while critical thinking becomes anathema.
This dysfunctional cultural software is reproduced through the institutions
of higher education and by the ever more acritical yet transnationally
integrated systems of diffusion of ideas as a form of Musak or mesmerizing
chant.
The Crisis of Learning and the Crisis of Ideas
At the heart of the multiple environmental, economic, social, but more
importantly, political crises there is a crisis of ideas. More precisely,
there is a crisis of learning: an inability to link theory and practice
and to correct errors. The UNDP's 1992 Human Development Report
pointed out that, while the North–South gap in human survival (the basic
component in human development, including life expectancy, literacy, nutrition,
infant/child mortality and access to safe water) had been relatively narrowed
in the 30-year period between 1960 and 1990, disparities in the cultural
gap had in fact increased (UNDP 1992). Unequivocally, the crisis of thinking
is closely connected with a profound global crisis in education, both formal
and informal, in all its levels. This crisis is not limited to the periphery.
As Ivan Illich observed many years ago,
"schooling" everywhere has become
divorced from education, thus encouraging goal displacement in the learning
process. Education through prevailing institutions has little to do with
enlightenment and with what Freire (1989) calls "the practice of freedom."
Far from offering people the tools to transform their world and unleash
their creativity for problem solving, conventional schooling is a bureaucratic
mechanism for human depowerment and for the entrenchment of conformity
and quiescence.
At the elementary levels, there is a generalized lack of access to basic
educational facilities, made even more dramatic due to global economic
restructuring. After decades of international efforts to eradicate illiteracy,
still over a billion adults cannot read or write and there are over 100
million children of primary school age who are not able to attend school
every year (UNDP 1992). Enrolment rates have also levelled off over the
past two decades. Secondary education everywhere is not only structured
upon a vertical compartmentalized and decreative pattern, but it is a luxury
which few can afford in the less affluent societies. Meanwhile, in developed
societies, which suffer from the same structural and operational malaise
described above with regards to "schooling," both the coverage of, and
access to, quality education has become increasingly restricted.
North America is confronted with a rapid and profound deterioration
of its educational system. For many years, mounting ineffectiveness was
dealt with by simply "throwing money into problems. "Now, with a general
fiscal crisis of the state, resources are dry. A comparison of the declining
rates of growth in global enrolments in all three levels will illustrate
this situation (Table 22).
| Table 22. Average annual increase in enrolment, 1970–88. |
|
Primary |
Secondary |
Tertiary |
All levels |
|
70–80 |
80–88 |
70–80 |
80–88 |
70–80 |
80–88 |
70–80 |
80–88 |
| Developing countries
Africa*
Asia
Arab states
Latin America**
|
8.1
6.1
8.8
5.0
4.7 |
1.1
1.6
0.6
4.0
1.5 |
10.3
11.5
9.9
9.1
5.0 |
3.1
4.1
2.7
6.0
3.6 |
9.4
6.9
6.9
13.2
11.2 |
4.4
7.1
3.7
5.4
4.6 |
8.6
6.7
9.1
6.2
5.0 |
1.7
2.0
1.3
4.6
2.1 |
| Developed countries |
-2.8 |
0.0 |
2.7 |
0.1 |
3.3 |
1.3 |
-0.3 |
0.2 |
| World |
4.8 |
0.9 |
6.9 |
2.1 |
5.2 |
2.6 |
5.4 |
1.3 |
Source: UNDESD 1993, p. 48.
* Sub-Saharan Africa
**Including the Caribbean |
However, despite the recognized crisis in Western, and specifically
North American, education, experts in those countries are exporting their
already obsolescent and dysfunctional educational structures and practices
to the periphery. The overall impact of such acritical exports of social
technology upon their recipients is at best dubious and at worst destructive.
It compounds the deleterious effects created by the other more commercial
cultural imports referred to earlier in this section: media imports.
The systemic paralysis of both primary and secondary levels worldwide
is recognized in all quarters as extremely acute. The crisis, however,
is much deeper in institutions of tertiary education, charged, in theory
at least, with the task of producing professionals and generating the cultural
"software" of society, including that required for the traimng of the trainers.
The crisis of tertiary education coincides not only with declining levels
of financing (and quality) but also with an accelerated closure (and the
corporate appropriation) of the "cultural commons." Tertiary education
is being restructured under the spell of the same forces that are shaping
the direction of other social institutions.
This is particularly noticeable in scientific research, affecting both
the "hard" and social sciences. Learning and knowledge are thus commodified
and alienated. When institutionalized education, as in the former Eastern
bloc, loses autonomy and becomes subservient to the managerial and ideological
apparatchik of power holders and institutional intellectuals, society's
aptitude for problem solving declines. A totalizing ideology always ends
up producing an official intelligentsia for whom orthodoxy and political
correctness substitute for critical self-examination and learning. It becomes
also unable to cope with the changes occurring in the real world around
it. Cybernetic stupidity and conformity set in as the learning process
becomes unable to correct errors and instead reproduces them.
Impractical Pragmatism
The prevailing mode of training emphasizes a largely "professional," incremental,
narrowly focused and homogeneous mindset. Alternative thought is deemed
either unscientific or heretical, or both. Vertical thinking and the short-run
perspective prevail. Thus, piecemeal solutions to big problems are produced.
The practical and the pragmatic end up not being the same. Pragmatism is
elevated into an official dogma. There is a practical need to overcome
the crisis to prevent catastrophe. However, the pragmatic approach, in
the absence of critical thinking and transcendental ethical standards,
leads to a highly fragmented problem solving pattern with an overriding
focus on quantifiable economic gain. Neoliberal modernizing strategies
and packages, like its now defunct socialist counterpart, favour the means
of action (readymade solutions or "answers") over the understanding of
the problems (or "questions"). Development and modernization become contradictory:
modernization, far from bringing development, contributes to decay. At
this stage, a self-sustained vicious cycle ensues: "solutions" create problems,
which lead to new inappropriate solutions, and so on.
The Abandonment of Politics
The fundamental connection between politics, on the one hand, and environmental,
economic, social and cultural security, is public policy. Politics involves
policymaking, the outcome of which is the allocation of rewards and deprivations
among various publics. In this sense, the issues of participation and regulation
are as central to the question of "good governance" as are the issues of
accumulation or enforcement. Western political theory, since the 1970s
has consistently abandoned a normative ideal based on participation, democracy
and the "input side" of politics favouring another teleology centred on
order, stability and governability (O'Brien 1968, Leys 1982). In this,
mainstream political thinking has reflected an equally significant shift
in macroeconomic management from "input," demand-side economics, to "output,"
supply side. The new political economy, exemplified by public choice theory,
unlike its authoritarian-capitalist predecessor, emphasises the role of
the merchant over the prince, but like the early Huntingtonian (1967, 1968)
formulation, it also ignores and deconstructs the citizen. Politics, as
in vulgar Marxism, is subordinated to a technobureaucracy which manages
"objective," natural-like economic laws, laws that cannot be legislated
or debated but are dictated or interpreted by those who understand the
arcane and reified realm of the behaviour of capital.
Deontology Without Ethics
One important characteristic of the dominant cultural mold is that functional
rationality prevails over substantial rationality (Mannheim 1962). Thus,
procedural and quantifiable correctness become the only valuable ethical
standards against which to make decisions, judge behaviour or evaluate
consequences. In the last analysis, only those with the appropriate technical
competence can judge; but they do so within the narrow and specific confines
of a never-questioned ideal model, teleology, discipline or profession.
Both the utopia (and the dystopia) which justify social action, substitute
a surrogate instrumental operational code — grounded on professional, efficiency
related and quantifiable considerations — for a transcendental value system
centred upon effects on people. The substitution is rationalized on the
basis of one premise: "what works is good." In this context, categorical
imperatives cast in deontological terms, such as maximization, profit or
efficiency displace moral responsibility (Goulet 1973). What really happens
to concrete and sentient people is replaced by systemic or functional abstractions
encased in lofty terms such as "order," "efficiency" and "profit."
The Closure of the Cultural Commons
The de facto global cultural regime is the consequence of technological
change combined with growing concentration of wealth and power. Yet, despite
the overwhehning power of Western media and ideology, an enormous variety
of cultural strains persist. The problem is that, lacking vehicles of dissemination
of their own, these cultural expressions, as with biological diversity,
are increasingly faced with extinction. Cultural variability is essential
for innovation and for the revitalization of any culture.
The Context
While the image of the physical and social world is homogenized by global
communications and technology in general, a tendency to monoculture develops.
The content of information is shaped by its medium, therefore giving superior
chances for dissemination to prepacked information. Under these circumstances,
the discourse of modernity has demonstrated a remarkable ability to incorporate
and/or trivialize intellectual challenges to its hegemony and generally
render them ineffective or counterproductive. In the 1970s and 1980s, actual
or potentially revolutionary notions such as "basic human needs," human
resources development, appropriate technology, women in development, and
others were smoothly incorporated into the rhetoric of bilateral and multilateral
agencies (as well as neoconservative think tanks) without altering the
fundamental nature of modernizing practices.
The Culture of the Culture
For the duration of the Cold War, national security and defence constituted
a broad set of overriding commands to suspend judgment and justify folly
and atrocity. They were categorical imperatives based on fear. The string
of human security outrages perpetrated since the 1940s, of which the recent
revelations about illegal experiments with radiation on unsuspecting individuals
is just a small part, comes to mind. In the postnuclear era, economic rationality,
the so-called logic of the market, is both the prime directive and its
own overriding command. Competitiveness, credit worthiness or improved
productivity have become catch words to justify practically any ethical
violation, irrespective of its nefarious consequences. There is an urgent
need to bring back ethics into the analysis of human behaviour and to link
both with public accountability.
Structures
The attempts by the United Nations and that of specialized agencies such
as Unesco to set the foundations of a new world information order — along
the lines of the proposals for a new international economic order — failed
to materialize in the 1980s, under relentless opposition by elites at the
core. Instead, the dominant sectors within the GATT have expanded and redefined
trade, thus commodifying cultural objects by means of proprietary rights.
Agriculture, pharmaceuticals, publishing, research and every form of human
activity falls within an expanded definition of services. This commodification
of innovation and of ideas in general has constituted a virtual closure
of humanity's cultural commons. Paradoxically, while globalization may
point in the direction of universalism, limited access to ideas and to
the institutions charged with their development and reproduction point
in quite a different direction.
Processes
Learning, the building of consciousness, the creation of values and the
development of operational rules for problem solving have been influenced
by the concentration and commodification of culture mentioned above. Cultural
production and dissemination is increasingly monopolized by the values,
tastes and mechanisms present at the dominant core. Imitation rather than
innovation prevails. In this sense, learning becomes quite discontinuous
with experience.
Effects
The consequences of this discontinuity are twofold. One is the obvious
inability of the existing paradigm to deal with its own concrete circumstances,
which may lead to a breakdown in the chains of signification (meaning)
in the cultural paradigm. Yet, there is also the possibility of a quite
contradictory effect: the recycling of the same ideas into a new rhetoric,
while retaining the fundamental tenets of the existing mold. So far, this
latter entropic tendency has prevailed.
It may be too early to claim a significant paradigmatic crisis or discontinuity
between modernization and ecologism. Attempts have been made by conservative
modernization theorists, whose intellectual roots are neo-Malthusian, to
incorporate the seemingly dissonant discourse of environmentalism into
neoclassical formulations by embracing cliches or by simple trivialization
of the ecological posture. Possibly the ideology of modernization has become
so entrenched that its proponents, like the "nuclear theologians" of not
so long ago, are ready to destroy the world to prove that their theory
is correct. The world may be in crisis, yet the paradigm that created the
crisis, its diagnoses and its prescriptions thrive and may survive us all.
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This file was created 14 April 1996
Copyright International Development Research Centre.